Private Law: Persons by Spaht, Katherine Shaw
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 41 | Number 2
Developments in the Law, 1979-1980: A Symposium
Winter 1981
Private Law: Persons
Katherine Shaw Spaht
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Private Law: Persons, 41 La. L. Rev. (1981)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol41/iss2/7
PERSONS
Katherine Shaw Spaht*
REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY
Recent decisions and attempted legislation reflect a change in
attitude toward alimony. Unquestionably, the alimony statutes, as
interpreted, have needed reassessment for years.' The current at-
titude towards alimony is best expressed in the language of Justice
Blanche, concurring in State v. Fuller."
The majority opinion convinces this writer that there is no
longer any valid legislative purpose in requiring one spouse to
support the other after the marriage has been dissolved.
Chivalry is dead if that was ever a historic reason. The
"realities of the domestic relationship" as they are claimed to ex-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The author has considered various aspects of alimony for the past five years
and has suggested reevaluation. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1972-1973 Term-Persons, 34 LA. L. REV. 201 (1974); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Persons, 35 LA. L. REV. 259 (1975); The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Persons, 36 LA. L.
REV. 335 (1976); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976
Term-Persons, 37 LA. L. REV. 305 (1977); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Persons, 38 LA. L. REV. 322 (1978); The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Persons, 39 LA. L. REV. 659
(1979); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Per-
sons, 40 LA. L. REV. 543 (1980).
2. 377 So. 2d 335 (La. 1979). The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the criminal
neglect statute which made neglect of the wife in destitute or necessitous circum-
stances a crime (R.S. 14:74 A[1]) was unconstitutional, a denial of equal protection of
the law under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
The court of appeal in Sonfield v. Deluca held that an ex-wife is not entitled to
alimony after divorce where she had $92,000 equity in a 19'/2-room house which she
purchased after divorce. The court wrote:
An ex-wife cannot leave her sufficient means tied up in a house beyond her rea-
sonable necessity, . . . and collect alimony indefinitely under a law allowing
alimony only when she has not sufficient means, simply because her means are
not liquid. Nonliquidity of otherwise sufficient means can at most be accepted as
justifying post-divorce alimony only during the period reasonably necessary to
convert in part into liquid assets.
377 So. 2d 380, 382 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
Finding that the court of appeals decision would force the ex-wife to sell her home
and exhaust the equity for her support, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. 385
So. 2d 232 (La. 1980).
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ist is a myth as women do indeed contribute to the financial sup-
port by working outside the home, and it is a fact that the hus-
band can take care of the children of the marriage just as well
as the wife, especially if enough funds are generated to place
them in a nursery or other child care establishment. Further-
more, the old notion that "generally, it is the man's responsibility
to provide a home and its essentials" is just another way of por-
traying a woman as an inferior, or worse yet, a dependent.3
The dissatisfaction is, among other things, attributable to a sense of
frustration evidenced by the expressions of Justice Blanche.
However, deliberation and rational consideration are necessary in
the reevaluation of alimony, not overreaction.
In Monk v. Monk,4 the wife in a partial community property set-
tlement, executed after the judgment of separation, waived her
right to permanent alimony. The court of appeal concluded that she
had effectively waived her right to alimony.' In distinguishing the
Louisiana Supreme Court decision of Holiday v. Holliday,' the court
opined, "Although not stated by the Supreme Court, the reason for
the differing views for waiver of permanent alimony and waiver of
alimony pendente lite goes to the essence of the two types of
alimony, viz., alimony pendent [sic] lite is the support between per-
sons still married, and permanent alimony is simply a pension given
by one spouse who is better off than the other."7 As authority for
the validity of a waiver of permanent alimony in a post-separation
community property settlement, the court of appeal cited Nelson v.
Walker.' In Nelson the Louisiana Supreme Court in dicta9 expressed
the view that the right to claim alimony might be alienated by a
person not under a contractual incapacity; the result being that a
waiver of alimony was a relative, not absolute, nullity ratifiable
after cessation of the disability. Yet, the court did observe that in
the Nelson case there was no proof that the wife had ever been in
3. 377 So. 2d at 338.
4. 376 So. 2d at 552 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
5. The court observed that the agreement was no longer a relative nullity due to
the incapacity of husband and wife to contract under Civil Code article 1790. The arti-
cle was amended to delete the reference to the incapacity of husband and wife to con-
tract with each other.
6. 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978). The Louisiana Supreme Court found that a waiver of
alimony pendent lite in an antenuptial matrimonial agreement was against public
policy, thus unenforceable.
7. 376 So. 2d 552, 554 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
8. 250 La. 545, 197 So. 2d 619 (1967).
9. The issue litigated in Nelson v. Walker concerned the validity of the partition
agreement as a division of community assets and not a claim for alimony.
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necessitous circumstances.'" Interestingly enough, at the 1980 ses-
sion of the legislature, a bill was introduced to amend Civil Code ar-
ticle 160 to permit a spouse to waive the right to alimony only after
divorce." The proposed amendment was less liberal than the deci-
sion in Monk v. Monk, but the bill failed to pass.
Unfortunately, the court of appeal in Monk failed to consider the
policy underlying alimony after divorce to determine if the public
had an interest, and whether the interest of the public outweighed
that of the spouses. The legislative purpose underlying alimony
after divorce is not chivalry, as Justice Blanche suggested," nor
delictual, as it was historically.'3 Instead, the reason for alimony
after divorce is to provide support for those who need it with a
minimal amount of social dislocation "by extracting it from those
who have provided similar maintenance in the past."'4 Obviously, the
public has a strong interest in seeing that persons in need are sup-
ported; for otherwise, the burden falls upon the public at large
through social programs supported by taxpayers. Alimony is one of
10, "There is no evidence of record that she was ever in necessitous circum-
stances or that she was at any time a potential charge of the State." 197 So. 2d at 625.
11. La. H.B. 725, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980).
12. See text at note 3, supra.
13. 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, pt. 1, no. 1259 at 696 (12th ed. La. St. L.
Inst. trans. 1959).
14. In theory, according to Planiol, alimony was not a continuance of the obliga-
tion of support which the spouses owe to each other mutually during the marriage, but
was founded upon the delictual principle "[wlhatever act of man causes damage to
another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." 1 M. PLANIOL, supra note
13, at no. 1259. However, it would appear that the underlying practical reason for
alimony is to provide support for those who need it, with a minimum amount of social
dislocation, by extracting it from those who have provided similar maintenance in the
past. As Planiol observes:
The community of life permitted the spouse without means to share the
welfare of the other. Suddenly through no fault of the spouse in question, he or
she finds himself or herself devoid of resources and plunged into poverty. It is
manifestly in such a case as this that the guilty party should be made to bear the
consequences of his wrongful acts.
Id. It is clear that without the antecedent marital obligation of mutual support there
could be no breach of a quasi-delictual obligation or resulting damage upon divorce.
Moreover, under article 160 of the present Civil Code, the wife may be allowed
alimony without proving the husband's fault. According to Justice Barham, the provi-
sion of this alimony is a
legislative attempt to fix economic responsibility for women who, having been
deprived by divorce of their husband's earnings, are now without means or in-
come for their maintenance. This socio-economic legislation is intended to assign
responsibility for the dependency of such divorced women so as to relieve them
from destitution and the State from their care.
Montz v. Montz, 253 La. at 907, 221 So. 2d at 44 (1969) (Barham, J., dissenting).
Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304, 309 n.12 (La. 1978).
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the ways"5 that the legislature has selected to distribute the societal
obligation to support those in need. Therefore, it is imperative that
the potential dependent not be permitted to contract with the
obligor "to obtain absolute relief from his potential future obliga-
tion." 6 The fear, of course, is that "[t]he dependent not presently in
need might be induced to waive his future right in return for a pre-
sent gain only to find later that he is much in need and must seek
relief from public sources." 7 Actually, in Monk such fears were
realized, as the wife had waived her right to alimony in exchange
for property, and then sought alimony after divorce when she subse-
quently needed support.
Although a waiver of alimony should be impermissible as a viola-
tion of public policy, 8 the legislation, as a necessary accommodation
to the obligor, should encourage the recipient to become self-
supporting. Other states have accomplished the latter objective by
means of "rehabilitative" alimony. The "rehabilitation principle,"
superimposed upon the "need principle"' 9 presently underlying Civil
Code Article 160, would permit an award to a needy spouse suffi-
cient to keep the spouse off the welfare rolls and to "'rehabilitate'
himself to the point that further alimony will not be needed."2
Legislation introduced" and a resolution22 passed at the 1980
legislative session reflect a desire to incorporate the notion of
rehabilitation into alimony after divorce considerations. The joint
15. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 148, 227, 229-34, 238-45. One author comments
that the family is the key institution for distributing wealth in society and that our Civil
Code articles reflect such a view. J. AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 631
(1978).
16. Professor Robert A. Pascal expressed this view in a commentary on Nelson v.
Walker, 250 La. 545, 197 So. 2d 619 (1967). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Persons, 28 LA. L. REV. 312, 314-16 (1968).
17. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Per-
sons, 28 LA. L. REV. 312, 315 (1968).
18. Winegard v. Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
425 (1980).
19. According to this principle, a spouse is entitled to be supported by his or her
ex-spouse at a level sufficient to stay off the welfare rolls. The principle's most
obvious virtue is the savings to taxpayers; its chief drawback, the tendency to
foster a life of continuing dependency by one spouse on the other.
J. AREEN, supra note 15, at 634.
20. Id.
21. La. S.B. 806, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980). The substance of the proposed amendment
to Civil Code article 160 was, "In no event shall termination of such alimony occur
later than five years after the date of final judgment of divorce, whether or not the
spouse remarries." Termination of an award of alimony after five years without
qualification was a relatively drastic solution to the problem of encouraging the recip-
ient to become self-supporting.
22. La. S. Con. Res. No. 164, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980).
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committee" created by the resolution is to study "the feasibility of
terminating alimony pendente lite and alimony after divorce under
specific circumstances after a certain period of time."24 In the
clauses of the resolution justifying the study by the joint committee,
the following statement is made: "WHEREAS, the elimination of
alimony under certain circumstances after a specific period of time
may force individuals to become productive members of society and
not become an undue burden upon divorced persons.''25
Without the necessity of additional legislation, such as that
adopted in Florida,26 authority exists for a judge in Louisiana to
award "rehabilitative" alimony. In the list of factors that appear in
Civil Code article 160, there appears: "the time necessary for the
recipient to acquire appropriate education, training, or employment
. " In interpreting the Florida statute27 which contains a list of
factors and similar "rehabilitation" language, the judge is permitted
in proper circumstances to award support to a needy spouse for a
limited period of time, until the spouse gets back on his feet and
becomes self-sustaining.28 The criterion of "proper circumstances"
presupposes that there exists a potential for self-support, for
without this capacity there is nothing to which one can be
rehabilitated. In Lash v. Lash,29 applying Florida's rehabilitative
alimony statute, the court found that in a marriage of long duration
in which the wife had given up her career upon marriage to manage
the home and to raise children and in which the husband had had
the opportunity to enhance his working expertise over the entire
period of his married life, different circumstances had to be con-
sidered. In such a case, the court concluded that he should be re-
quired to contribute to her support on a permanent basis.
Concerning the duration of an alimony award, one suggested
legislative alteration is to provide that an alimony judgment shall
only be effective for three years, but may be renewed upon proof of
23. The joint committee is to consist of members of the Senate Committee on
Judiciary, section A, and the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure.
24. La. S. Con. Res. No. 164, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980).
25. Id.
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (1978): "In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage,
the court may grant alimony to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or
permanent in nature. ...
"In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the court shall consider
all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to: ....
"(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient
education or training to enable him or her to find appropriate employment.
27. Id.
28. Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241 (Fla. App. 1975).
29. Id.
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continuing need. A similar New Hampshire statute3" applies the
three-year duration to an award when there are no children or only
major children of the marriage of the recipient and obligor. The
three-year duration of an award does not automatically terminate it,
as proposed in Senate Bill 806,"' yet the recipient bears the burden
of proving need every three years. Presently under Louisiana law,
the spouse seeking a change in alimony must prove a change of cir-
cumstances. Shifting the burden of proof to the recipient by statute
in the two instances in which there are no children or major
children seems particularly appropriate considering the underlying
"need" and "rehabilitation" principles of alimony.
Nationally, as in Louisiana, "need," tempered by the notion of
"rehabilitation," is "the leading candidate to take the place of fault
as the key principle to guide the allocation of assets at divorce."32
Thus, as "need" replaces "fault," fault as a criteria for awarding
alimony after divorce should be eliminated.3 If fault is eliminated as
a consideration in awarding alimony after divorce, the effect may
necessitate reconsideration of the grounds for separation and
divorce based upon fault.
SINGLE "NO FAULT" GROUNDS FOR SEPARATION
Complimentary to shifting policies underlying alimony is a
reconsideration of the "fault" of a spouse as grounds for separation
and divorce. If in determining entitlement to alimony after divorce,
"fault" is no longer relevant, as previously discussed, the question
may be posed, "What purpose is served by proof of 'fault' in the
separation and divorce proceedings?" As this author has previously
stated,"4 a conclusion that one spouse alone is at fault in the
"breakdown of a marriage" is frequently unrealistic. Rarely are the
"irreconcilable differences" of the spouses due to the fault of only
one spouse. Eliminating the possibility (presently economic necessity)"
30. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1955).
31. See note 21, supra.
32. J. AREEN, supra note 15, at 634.
33. LA. CIv. CODE art. 160: "When a spouse has not been at fault and has not suffi-
cient means for support, the court may allow that spouse, out of the property and
earnings of the other spouse, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his or her in-
come ...."
34. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Per-
sons, 34 LA. L. REV. 201, 203-04 (1974); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1973-1974 Term-Persons, 35 LA. L. REV. 259, 265 (1975); The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Persons, 36 LA. L. REV. 335, 337
(1976); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Persons,
39 LA. L. REV. 659, 665 (1979).
35. Under Civil Code article 160, it is necessary for the spouse seeking alimony to
19811
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of proving a spouse at fault in separation litigation would allow
spouses to sever the ties of a deteriorating relationship, in itself
psychologically traumatic, without a public trial in which the parties
hurl accusations and recriminations at each other. Amending the ex-
isting Civil Code articles" to provide a single ground for separa-
tion-thirty days living separate and apart 3"-is suggested.
Because of recent decisions, the only relief available for some
couples seeking a separation or divorce is to live separate and apart
for the required period of time-either six months or one year." For
example, in three decisions,39 conduct by a spouse which would or-
dinarily constitute "fault" for separation purposes was excused
because of mental illness and, in one instance, chronic alcoholism.'0
In other decisions, 1 a reconventional demand for separation based
upon abandonment without "lawful cause" was dismissed, even
though the plaintiff failed to prove grounds for separation in the
nature of "fault".' 2 In these situations the immediate alternative of
the spouses whose suits are dismissed is to live separate and apart
for either six months'" or one year."
Under the jurisprudence the testimony of a psychologist or psy-
chiatrist as to the nature of the mental or emotional disorder of a
spouse might be sufficient to legally excuse the spouse of "fault".
Yet, in at least one of the decisions considering the lack of culpabil-
ity of a spouse afflicted with mental or emotional problems, the
court concluded that the other spouse had "lawful cause" to abandon
prove that he is "not at fault." Furthermore, if both spouses are found "at fault" under
Civil Code article 138 (grounds for separation) then neither may claim alimony after
divorce by virtue of the statutory language of Civil Code article 141.
36. Civil Code articles 138 and 141 should be repealed.
37. See note 34, supra.
38. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 138 (9) & (10). See also LA. R.S. 9:301 (1950), as amended
by 1979 La. Acts, No. 360, § 1.
39. Bettencourtt v. Bettencourtt, 381 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied,
383 So. 2d 12 (La. 1980); Gipson v. Gipson, 379 So. 2d 1171 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 383 So. 2d 799 (La. 1980); Anderson v. Anderson, 379 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1979).
40. Anderson v. Anderson, 379 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
41. Von Bechman v.'Von Bechman, 386 So. 2d 910 (La. 1980); Mahmud v. Mahmud,
384 So. 2d 823 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Levine v. Levine, 373 So. 2d 1380 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1979).
42. LA. CIv. CODE art. 138. The problem of entertaining a reconventional demand
for abandonment and the proof that should be required if plaintiff fails in his burden of
proof is considered in R. PASCAL AND K. SPAHT, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE 122-23
(2d ed. 1979).
43. LA. CiV. CODE art. 138(10).
44. LA. CiV. CODE art. 138(9). See LA. R.S. 9:301 ('950), as amended by 1979 La.
Acts. No. 360, § 1.
[Vol. 41
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her." In Anderson v. Anderson,'" in which the wife's habitual in-
temperance was excused because of her chronic alcoholism combined
with diagnosed schizo-affective schizophrenia, depressed type, the
husband nonetheless was considered as having had "cause" to con-
structively abandon her. 7 Legal analysis, in the Anderson case, of
the proof required of "lawful cause" parallels that in the decisions
mentioned above involving reconventional demands for abandon-
ment when the plaintiffs suit has been dismissed.'8
If as a result of these decisions spouses are relegated to seeking
as their only alternative a "no-fault" separation or divorce, the
judiciary has accomplished what the legislature has not since first
presented with the opportunity in 1948." The legislature might still,
however, contribute significantly. By recognizing that judicial deci-
sions make "no-fault" separation the only relief available to many
spouses, the legislature could respond by enacting legislation consis-
tent with the development. A single "no-fault" ground for separation
is surely not a novel idea nationally. Although the author advocates
45. But see Gipson v. Gipson, 379 So. 2d 1171, 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 383 So. 2d 799 (La. 1980). The court found that the husband had been guilty of
constructive abandonment and cruel treatment. According to the court, "Plaintiff (hus-
band) admits telling defendant he no longer loved her during the month of August
1978 and a few days thereafter taking defendant and the children to her parents [sic]
home and leaving them. At the time of trial he continued to admit he no longer cared
for defendant and did not want to resume the marriage relationship." (Emphasis added).
46. 379 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
47. Simply because plaintiff did not prove his case for a separation based on the
fault of defendant, did not relieve defendant in her reconventional demand from
proving that his compelling her to leave the matrimonial domicile was "without a
lawful cause." From the recitation of the facts already provided, it is clear that
plaintiff had lawful cause for separating from his wife and she is not entitled to a
judgment of separation against him for abandonment.
Id. at 797.
48. In Levine v. Levine, 373 So. 2d 1380, 1384 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), the court
stated, "It is true that 'lawful cause' necessary to justify a spouse's leaving the
matrimonial domicile need not be such as to constitute lawful grounds for separation."
In Mahmud v. Mahmud, 384 So. 2d 823, 825 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), the court opined,
"However, the deep-rooted irreconcilable differences were such that living together
became intolerable for both parties. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude
that a party who leaves or withdraws from the matrimonial domicile is without lawful
cause."
49. The bill introduced would have:
"1. Declared living separate and apart for one year the only cause for divorce.
"2. Allowed proof of the living separate and apart only if one of spouses had
recorded on the parish records, at least one year before the filing of suit, a declaration
of his or her having begun to live separate and apart from the other with the intent of
obtaining a divorce.
"3. Made recordation of the above declaration the equivalent of a judgment of
separation from bed and board." R. PASCAL AND K. SPAHT, supra, note 42, at 128.
1981]
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a single "no-fault" ground for separation, it is desirable to retain a
substantial waiting period between the judgment of separation and
that of divorce to encourage reflection and, for policy reasons, at-
tempts at reconciliation.
ESTABLISHING FILIATION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
With the continuing expansion of the rights of illegitimate
children accomplished by judicial decision,5" the proof necessary to
establish filiation, the parent-child bond,5 assumes increased
significance. In 1976, the author predicted that:
It is likely that future decisions of the United States Supreme
Court will remove many of the remaining impediments imposed
upon illegitimate children, particularly in successions law. Classi-
fication will in the future have less significance. It would still
seem a basic goal to fix paternity on the basis of a biological con-
nection, to relate in the father-child bond two persons who in
fact possess that bond. Filiation will in the future retain its
significance."
50. Most recently, Louisiana Civil Code article 919 permitting illegitimate children
acknowledged by the father to inherit only if he failed to be survived by legitimate
descendants, ascendants, collaterals, or surviving wife was declared unconstitutional as
a denial of equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, § 3 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. Succession of
Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980). In two previous decisions, the constitutionality of
article 919 had been avoided. Ouiett v. Estate of Moore, 378 So. 2d 362 (La. 1979);
Jackson v. Gordon, 381 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980). In Succession of Brown,
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), was cited as authority for the proposition that
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits difference in
treatment of illegitimate and legitimate children absent considerations of the quality of
proof of paternity. The decision of the court of appeal in Brown, 379 So. 2d 1172 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1980), contains an excellent analysis of the United States constitutional
cases and application of the principles enunciated in those decisions to Civil Code arti-
cle 919. The rationale discussed in the court of appeal decision may be utilized to
determine the constitutionality of other Civil Code articles which draw distinctions in
rights accorded to an individual on account of "his birth"-ie., Civil Code articles 238
through 244 (support rights of illegitimate children) compared to articles 227, 229, and
230 through 234 (support rights and obligations of legitimate descendants); Civil Code
articles 246-50 (natural tutorship of legitimate children) and article 256 (tutorship of il-
legitimate children); Civil Code articles 886-914 (regular successions, legitimate rela-
tions) and articles 917-33 (irregular successions, including illegitimate relations); Civil
Code article 1493 (guaranteeing to legitimate children a forced portion of the estate of
the parent) and article 1484 (permitting only certain dispositions in favor of illegitimate
children).
51. Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest Presumption Challenged,- Speculations on War-
ren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REV. 59, 65 (1976).
52. Id. at 82-83.
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Proof of legitimate filiation continues to be made, by first
identifying the mother and the fact of conception or birth of a
child during her marriage. To avoid insuperable problems of
proof of paternity adjudicated on a case-by-case basis, the law
established a presumption that the husband of the mother is the
father of the child. 3 The marriage contract confers upon the hus-
band the right to exclusive sexual access to the wife and
therefore provides a basis for the presumption." The possibility
of fraud or error in fixing paternity and thus legitimate filiation
is diminished by moral constraints and the husband's vigilance.5"
In the case of filiation outside of marriage, proof has depended
historically upon the reputed father's voluntary admission, either ex-
press or tacit, of paternity. The unreliability of such proof and the
53. LA. Civ. CODE art. 184.
54. See W. HOOPER, THE LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY 2 (1911).
55. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 187-90.
56. Within the codal framework, historically, the class of illegitimate children was
further subdivided into those illegitimate children who could not be acknowledged or
legitimated, illegitimate children who obtained a judgment of paternity or maternity
against the biological parent, LA. CIv. CODE arts. 208-12, illegitimates who were
acknowledged by their biological parent, LA. CIv. CODE arts. 202-07, and illegitimate
children who were legitimated, LA. CIv. CODE arts. 198-201.
Civil Code article 181 mentions two sorts of illegitimates: "Those who are born
from two parents, who, at the moment when such children were conceived might have
legally contracted marriage with each other; and those who are born from persons to
whose marriage there existed at the time some legal impediment." Into the latter
category fall (1) adulterous bastards, "those produced by an unlawful connection be-
tween two persons, who, at the time when the child was conceived, were, either of
them or both connected by marriage with some other person," LA. CIv. CODE art. 182
and (2) incestuous bastards, "those who are produced by the illegal connection of two
persons who are relations within the degree prohibited by law." LA. CIv. CODE art.
183. Adulterous and incestuous bastards, generally speaking, cannot be acknowledged
or legitimated. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 198, 200, & 204. However, there are exceptions. In
the case of adulterous bastards, if there is a subsequent legal marriage of the
biological parents, after the impediment to the marriage is removed, the child may be
acknowledged. LA. CIv. CODE art. 204. If he is so acknowledged, he is automatically
legitimated. LA. CiV. CODE art. 198. Furthermore, once the impediment to the marriage
is removed, a biological parent can in some instances legitimate the child by notarial
act, LA. Civ. CODE art. 200, which necessarily includes the right to acknowledge the
child by act. LA. Civ. CODE art. 203. See Goins v. Gates, 229 La. 740, 93 So. 2d 307
(1957). The latter right exists regardless of whether the biological parents contract a
legal marriage. As to incestusous bastards, by virtue of the 1972 and 1974 legislative
amendments to Civil Code article 95, certain children born during the existence of a
marriage contracted between persons related within the prohibited degrees prior to
1974 are now to be considered legitimate. (The amendment in 1972, and again in 1974,
ratified all marriages contracted in contravention of Civil Code article 95). But, note
the specific prohibition contained in Civil Code article 198, prohibiting legitimation of
incestuous bastards by subsequent marriage of the natural parents.
Despite the provisions prohibiting in certain instances the acknowledgment and/or
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law's corresponding lack of confidence were the reasons for distin-
guishing the classification of children as legitimate or illegitimate.
However, because of the effect of such classification, ie., inferior
support and succession rights, Louisiana statutes have been suscep-
tible to constitutional attack. Yet, even in the United States
Supreme Court decisions, the interest the state has in the quality of
proof necessary to establish filiation has been recognized as impor-
tant," particularly in view of the problems of stability of land titles
and stale or spurious claims.
Anticipating the Lousiana Supreme Court decision in Succession
of Brown," the legislature passed a Senate bill amending Civil Code
legitimation of adulterous and incestuous bastards, there is no such specific prohibition
contained in the articles regulating proof of paternity. See In re Tyson, 306 So. 2d 823
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1975). An illegitimate, under Civil Code article 208 who has "not been
legally acknowledged, may be allowed to prove" his paternal descent by proof as out-
lined in Civil Code articles 209-10. Upon establishing paternal descent, the illegitimate
becomes entitled to claim financial support in the form of alimony. LA. CIV. CODE arts.
240-45.
An illegitimate child who is acknowledged by his natural parent enjoys not only the
right to claim alimony from the parent so acknowledging, LA. Civ. CODE art. 242, but
also the restricted right of intestate inheritance. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 918-19. Under the
coda) scheme an illegitimate could only be acknowledged by one of two methods: (1)
notarial act or (2) registering of the birth or baptism of such child. LA. Civ. CODE art.
203. However, the court in Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635 (1921), recognized an
alternate method of acknowledgment, hereinafter referred to as informal acknowledge-
ment. Proof of informal acknowledgment consisted essentially of the same proof re-
quired for paternal descent under Civil Code article 209. See Minor v. Young, 149 La.
583, 89 So. 757 (1921). Informal acknowledgment was legislatively recognized in a 1944
amendment to article 198.
Historically, the effect of legitimation upon the illegitimate's status was to accord
to that child the same rights as a legitimate child, LA. Civ. CODE art. 199, to date from
the last act required for legitimation. See 1 M. PLANIOL, supra note 13, no. 1567 at 869;
LA. CIV. CODE 198 & 200.
57. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977): "The more serious problems of
proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children
claiming under their fathers' estates than that required either for illegitimate children
claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally."
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 271 (1978): "Even where an individual claiming to be the
illegitimate child of a deceased man makes himself known, the difficulties facing an
estate are likely to persist. Because of the particular problems of proof, spurious
claims may be difficult to expose."
58. In the court of appeal opinion in Succession of Brown, 379 So. 2d 1172, 1178-79
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), the court observed:
Our legislature could and should protect the soundness of our land titles by evolv-
ing a test permitting illegitimates to inherit equally with legitimates under cir-
cumstances where such a rule does not endanger title soundness, and prohibiting
their right to inherit equally when to do so would threaten the stability of titles....
We anticipate that the legislature will in the near future address itself to the
problem .. . .
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articles 208 and 209"9 on proof of filiation by unacknowledged il-
legitimates. Retaining certain express formal admissions by mother
or father as sufficient proof of filiation (legitimation and formal
acknowledgment"0 ), the amended legislation provides other cir-
cumstances which may establish a parent-child link. Some of the cir-
cumstances delineated in the statute parallel the conduct which the
judiciary recognized in the past as express and tacit admissions of
parentage. 1
Initially, the statute distinguishes between illegitimate children
who "may be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of filiation""2 and
those who must establish filiation "by a civil proceeding instituted
59. LA. CIv. CODE art. 208: "Illegitimate children, who have not been legally
acknowledged, may be allowed to prove their paternal descent."
LA. CIV. CODE art. 209:
In the case where the proof of paternal descent is authorized by the preceding ar-
ticle, the proof may be made in either of the following ways:
1. By all kinds of private writings, in which the father may have acknowledged
the bastard as his child, or may have called him so;
2. When the father, either in public or in private, has acknowledged him as his
child, or has called him so in conversation, or has caused him to be educated as
such;
3. When the mother of the child was known as living in a state of concubinage
with the father, and resided as such in his house at the time when the child was
conceived.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held article 919 unconstitutional as violative of the
equal protection guarantees of both the United States and Louisiana constitutions
because of the absence of any legislative authority for illegitimates who have been
discriminated against because of their status, to "remedy their loss of succession rights
as the children of their father .... "
Civil Code articles 210 and 212 were repealed.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 210: "The oath of the mother, supported by proof of the
cohabitation of the reputed father with her, out of his house, is not sufficient to
establish natural paternal descent, if the mother be known as a woman of dissolute
manners, or as having had an unlawful connection with one or more men (other than
the man whom she declares to be the father of the child) either before or since the
birth of the child."
LA. CIv. CODE art. 212: "Illegitimate children of every description may make proof
of their maternal descent, provided the mother be not a married woman.
"But the child who will make such proof shall be bound to show that he is identically
the same person as the child whom the mother brought forth."
60. LA. CIv. CODE art. 208, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1: "Il-
legitimate children who have not been acknowledged as provided in Article 203, may
be allowed to prove their filiation." (Emphasis added).
LA. CIv. CODE art. 203, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 1: "The
acknowledgment of an illegitimate child shall be made by a declaration executed before
a notary public, in the presence of two witnesses, by the father and mother or either
of them, or it may be made in the registering of the birth or baptism of such child."
61. See note 56, supra.
62. LA. CIV. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1:
An illegitimate child may be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of filiation
1981]
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by the child or on his behalf ... within the time limitation prescribed in
this Article."6 Distinguishing in the first paragraph between the use
of the presumption of filiation and the necessity of a "civil pro-
ceeding" to establish filiation, two conclusions may logically be
reached: 1) "Civil proceeding" means a particular type of proceeding
for the sole purpose of establishing filiation, and this peculiar pro-
ceeding is subject to a special time limitation prescribed in the arti-
cle." 2) The "presumption" of filiation need not be asserted in this
special "civil proceeding," as the statute does not require it; further-
more, its invocation is not subject to the time limitation prescribed
in the article. 5
The statute establishes a presumption of paternity where the
child is shown to be the child of a woman on an original certificate
of birth, rebuttable by a preponderance of contrary evidence. In
the case of paternity, evidence that the mother and alleged father
were known as living in a state of concubinage and resided as such
at the time of the child's conception creates "a rebuttable presump-
tion of filiation between the child and the alleged father." 7 As to
paternal filiation, the statutory language creating the presumption
is almost identical to the provision of former article 209 which pro-
vided that proof of paternal descent could be made when the mother
was known as living in a state of concubinage with the father at the
time of the child's conception. 6 However, the proof of paternal des-
cent made by evidence of concubinage was not referred to in article
209 as a "presumption."
under the provisions of this article. Or any child may establish filiation,
regardless of the circumstances of conception, by a civil proceeding instituted by
the child or on his behalf in the parish of his birth, or other proper venue as pro-
vided by law, within the time limitation prescribed in this Article.
(Emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. LA. CIv. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1:
5. A civil proceeding to establish filiation must be brought within six months
after the death of the alleged parent, or within nineteen years of the illegitimate
child's birth, whichever occurs first. If an illegitimate child is born posthumously,
a civil proceeding to establish filiation must be instituted within six months of its
birth, unless there is a presumption of filiation as set forth in Section 2 above.
(Emphasis added). Reference to section 2 above did not include the section which
established a presumption of paternity (section 4), but was an inadvertent mistake.
65. Id. Note particularly the emphasized language.
66. LA. CIV. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1.
67. 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 4.
68. LA. CIv. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1:
In the case where the proof of paternal descent is authorized by the preceding ar-
ticle, the proof may be made in either of the following ways: ... 3. When the
mother of the child was known as living in a state of concubinage with the father,
and resided as such in his house at the time when the child was conceived.
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Labelling such evidence as a presumption of paternity affects
other statutes, most notably Civil Code article 186: "The husband of
the mother is not presumed to be the father of the child if another
man is presumed to be the father." Thus, by applying both article
209 (as amended) and article 186, if a wife is living in a state of con-
cubinage at the time of conception of a child, the husband under ar-
ticle 186 is not presumed to be the father. 9 Under article 209, the
paramour of the wife is "presumed" to be the father and it is unnec-
essary that the special "civil proceeding" establishing paternity be
instituted within the prescribed time period. Yet, the amended legis-
lation does not provide a mechanism for the paramour, presumed
father, or his heirs to timely disavow paternity by a preponderance
of evidence to the contrary. Presumably, the omission of the mech-
anism for disavowal of illegitimate filiation is explained by the fact
that the authors of the legislation considered the institution of a
"civil proceeding" necessary to invoke the rebuttable presumption.
In other words, the legislators did not consider the presumption of
illegitimate filiation self-operative, as in the case of the presumption
of legitimate paternity absent timely disavowal. However, the lan-
guage of section 1 of article 209, as amended, which introduces the
remaining sections, distinguishes the presumption from the evidence
necessary to establish legitimate filiation in a "civil proceeding."
Another problem created by the distinction between the
"presumption" and a "civil proceeding" is the applicability of the time
limit, a peremptive0 period. Because of the statutory language," if
69. Article 186 was intended to apply where a child was conceived during one
marriage but born during a second, thus creating "overlapping" presumptions under
Louisiana Civil Code articles 184-85. Louisiana Civil Code article 184 reads: "The hus-
band of the mother is presumed to be the father of all children born or conceived dur-
ing the marriage." (Emphasis added). The solution offered by article 186 to the dilemma
of "overlapping" presumptions is to apply the presumption to the first husband of the
wife. Usually, although not always, the child is in actuality the biological child of the
second husband. In France, the solution to the problem of conception and birth during
different marriages is to consider the child legitimated by the subsequent (to concep-
tion) marriage of his parents (Louisiana Civil Code article 198), which automatically
displaces the presumption of paternity of the wife's first husband. See discussion of
French rule in Judge Tate's dissenting opinion in George v. Bertrand, 217 So. 2d 47, 49
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (Tate, J., dissenting).
70. LA. CIV. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1: "5. If no
proceeding is timely instituted, the claim of an illegitimate child or on its behalf to
rights in the succession of the alleged parent shall be forever barred. The time limita-
tion provided in this Article shall run against all persons, including minors and inter-
dicts."
The time limitation provided for the husband's disavowal of a child born to his wife
has been held to create a peremption. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 189-90; Pounds v. Schori,
377 So. 2d 1195 (La. 1979).
71. LA. CIv. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1:
5. A civil proceeding to establish filiation must be brought within six months after
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an illegitimate child is entitled to the presumption of filiation, he
may invoke it in any proceeding at any time without the limitation
of the peremptive period in article 209. Such an interpretation,
however, violates the obvious legislative intent to avoid the problem
of "stale" claims referred to by the court of appeal in Succession of
Brown."2 In fact, two of the alternatives suggested by Professor
Johnson in a report to the Louisiana Law Institute, which was cited
in Succession of Brown, were adopted."3 The time limitation for insti-
tuting the civil proceeding to establish filiation is "within six months
after the death of the alleged parent, or within nineteen years of the
illegitimate child's birth, whichever occurs first."'"
If the alleged parent dies during the minority of the illegitimate
child, presumably the surviving natural parent must qualify as
natural tutor"5 and institute the proceeding on behalf of the minor.
The mother is of right the natural tutrix; after her death, if the
father did not acknowledge the child prior to the mother's death,
the court is required to consider first either of the mother's parents
or siblings who survive her, then the father. If the person entitled
to claim the natural tutorship of the illegitimate child fails to qualify
and institute the civil proceedings, the child possibly could have an
action against him for the damages he suffered. The origin of such a
claim does not lie in the failure of a tutor to perform his respon-
sibilities" but possibly, by analogy, in a failure of the minor's "rela-
tions" to cause a tutor to be appointed.7
the death of the alleged parent, or within nineteen years of the illegitimate child's
birth, whichever occurs first. If an illegitimate child is born posthumously, a civil
proceeding to establish filiation must be instituted within six months of its birth,
unless there is presumption of filiation as set forth in Section 2 above ....
72. 379 So. 2d 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
73. Id. at 1178.
As suggested by H. Alston Johnson in his Report To The Louisiana State Law
Institute (Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, Bk III, Titles I & II, Suc-
cessions and Donations, December 7, 1979), the Louisiana Legislature could re-
quire proof of filiation to be made (1) only during the lifetime of the father, (2)
within six months of the father's death, or (3) within six months after the majority
of the illegitimate claiming as heir.
379 So. 2d at 1178.
74. LA. CIV. CODE art. 209.
75. LA. Civ. CODE art. 256, as amended by 1979 La. Acts. No. 536, § 1.
76. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4171.
77. LA. CIV. CODE art. 310:
Relations who have neglected to cause a tutor to be appointed, are responsible for
the damages which the minor may have suffered.
This responsibility is enforced against relations in the order according to
which they are called to the inheritance of the minor, so that they are responsible
only in case of the insolvency of him or them who precede them in that order, and
this responsibility is not in solidum between relations who have a right to the in-
heritance in the same degree. (Emphasis added).
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To further complicate application of the statute, which became
effective upon signature of the Governor (July 23, 1980),"' a special
section provides:
Any illegitimate child nineteen years of age or older shall have
one year from the effective date of this Act to bring a civil pro-
ceeding to establish filiation under the provisions of this Act and
if no such proceeding is instituted within such time, the claim of
such an illegitimate child shall be forever barred. 9
The purpose of the section is similar to a statute of repose because
the legislature anticipated that Succession of Brown might be
retroactive."0 If the decision declaring article 919 unconstitutional
were applied retroactively, an illegitimate could seek to annul a
judgment of possession in a succession in which he was not recognized
as an heir. Furthermore, he could seek to recover from third per-
sons property alienated by the heirs within ten years of the judg-
ment of possession. 1 By including a one-year period ending July 23,
1981, within which illegitimates may bring a civil proceeding to
establish filiation, the retroactive application of Brown would create
fewer problems. An illegitimate child who has been formally ac-
knowledged or possibly who is entitled to a rebuttable presumption
of filiation is not affected, however, by the one-year statutory
period. The one-year period provided an illegitimate to assert filia-
tion in a civil proceeding seems reasonable except as applied to a
child who is under the age of nineteen and whose alleged parent has
been dead for more than six months. In the latter case, the child, or
his tutor on his behalf, is effectively denied any succession rights
possibly created by Succession of Brown.
Prospectively, the statute is a relatively liberal one in the proof
acceptable to establish filiation absent a presumption. Evidence may
include events, conduct, or other information such as an acknow-
ledgement in a testament which occurred during the lifetime of the
alleged parent, 2 and the burden of proof to establish filiation is a
preponderance of the evidence.83 Assuming that filiation is established,
78. 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 3.
79. 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 4.
80. Other state courts faced with a similar problem, the retroactivity of Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), refused to apply retroactively a decision affecting the
validity of their succession statutes. Frakes v. Hunt, 583 S.W.2d 497 (Ark. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 297 (1979); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1978); Allen
v. Harvey, 568 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn. 1978).
81. LA. R.S. 9:5682 (Supp. 1975).
82. LA. CIV. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1.
83. LA. CIv. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1: "4. A child
of a man may prove filiation by any means which establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, including acknowledgment in a testament, that he is the child of that man .... "
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the child will be entitled to succession rights-thus, more liberal
than the New York statute as interpreted in Lalli v. Lalli. 4
84. 1 N.Y. EST., POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967). The United
States Supreme Court upheld the statute which allowed an illegitimate to inherit from
his father only if a court had, during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filia-
tion declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother
of within two years from the birth of the child. The court stated:
As the history of § 4-1.2 clearly illustrates, the New York Legislature desired to
"grant to illegitimates in so far as practicable rights of inheritance on a par with
those enjoyed by legitimate children," ... while protecting the important state in-
terests . . . Section 4-1.2 represents a carefully considered legislative judgment as
to how this balance test could be achieved. Even if . . . § 4-1.2 could have been
written somewhat more equitably, it is not the function of a court "to hypothesize
independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative[s]" to
the statutory scheme formulated by New York.
439 U.S. 259 (1978).
